IntroductIon: Why Me?
My book, The Way We Die Now, was published in May 2016. 1 Since then, the most common question I have been asked is: why is a gastroenterologist writing about death and dying? I work as a gastroenterologist and general physician in a large Irish teaching hospital. Like most physicians doing general medical 'take', the majority of patients admitted under my care are frail elderly people with multiple comorbidities. And like most gastroenterologists nowadays, the majority of my speciality in-patients are people with chronic liver disease. Death is a common outcome in both groups of patients. I became increasingly aware that some families harboured unrealistic expectations of the hospital treatment of their sick elderly relatives. I also became concerned that my patients with chronic liver disease -which has a worse prognosis than most cancerswere not generally aware of this prognosis, and were not availing of proper palliative care at the end of life. I have witnessed many deaths from liver failure in relatively young people, yet death is rarely discussed with these patients and their families, who tend to assume that modern medicine can fix broken organs, or if they cannot be fixed, they can be replaced.
Most of what I had read about death and dying came from a palliative care perspective, yet at least half of all deaths, both in Ireland and the UK, take place in acute general hospitals, with only 4-5% dying in hospices. There seemed to be very little written about death and dying from the perspective of doctors working in a general hospital. No doubt a palliative care physician would have written a different book, but their patients are, if I may use the term, more 'packaged'. By the time hospice doctors become involved, much of the heavy lifting -in terms of altering expectation -has been done. I deal with death in many guises: from the rapid and messy death in the emergency department resuscitation room, to the slow, lingering death from liver disease on the general ward, to the high-tech death in the Intensive Care Unit. I witness the sudden deceleration in medical intensity, when we abruptly shift from full intervention, to the single room, the syringe-driver and the chaplaincy service. Some of the deaths I see are undignified: the dying have not accepted or understood their situation, the truth denied them by well-intentioned relatives and doctors. Their death has been stolen from them. Death in modern general hospitals now has the faint whiff of an industrial accident, a failure of medical intervention.
Another reason for my growing interest in so-called 'end of life' issues was percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG). Over a period of several years, I had become increasingly concerned that this procedure was being carried out on patients who derived no benefit from it. Eventually I reached the uncomfortable conclusion that, in many cases, this form of feeding was instituted mainly to meet the complex emotional, professional -even economic -needs of families and care-givers, rather than those of the patient. PEG, in these patients, was a technical panacea for existential problems. 2
A Good deAth?
Those who write and lecture about death and dying hold up the 'good death' and 'death with dignity' as their ideal. I am not even sure what these overused phrases mean. The ideal of a 'good death' is endlessly debated as something desirable and achievable, yet this notion is hugely subjective, poorly understood, and quite probably not a generalisable concept. I support their desire to treat pain properly and to protect the dying from futile treatments. But I wonder if what they want is to 'tame' death, to strip it of its grandeur, to turn it into a medical process that can be managed, policed and workshopped. Henry James called it 'the distinguished thing', but death, for most people, is banal, anticlimactic. The End is robbed of its significance by our new hospital rituals. Most people who die in hospitals do so after several days of syringe-driver-induced oblivion. Ivan Illich, that turbulent priest and philosopher, argued that dying was yet another aspect of human life which had been colonised and taken over by medical busybodies. 3 This medicalisation, he argued, 'constitutes The way we die now: a personal reflection a prolific bureaucratic program based on the denial of each man's need to deal with pain, sickness and death.' This medicalisation is a form of 'cultural iatrogenesis', which caused us to lose our ability to accept death, and to devalue our traditional rituals around death and dying: 'Through the medicalization of death, health care has become a monolithic world religion.' 4 Illich believed there is a profound difference between pain and suffering. Pain, he argued, is a sensation, but suffering is a practice: cultural iatrogenesis has robbed people in Western countries of the ability to suffer. Medicine, which convinced people that all pain is curable, has made pain unendurable: 'I invite all to shift their gaze, their thoughts, from worrying about health care to cultivating the art of living. And today, with equal importance, to the art of suffering, the art of dying.'
So what is 'a good death'? Naturally, we want it to be free of pain. Most of us want it to happen at home, in an atmosphere of dignity and calm, surrounded by family. Our contemporary culture values the idea of death as 'personal growth', a spiritual event. A 'good death' is also one where the dying man and his family and friends openly acknowledge its imminence. Death is a time, too, for 'closure', when conflicts and unfinished business are resolved. So the contemporary consensus is that it should go something like this: aged 100, after a lifetime of professional achievement and personal happiness, you become acutely ill, having never experienced any sickness more serious than a cold. This illness does not rob you of your mental faculties, your ability to communicate or to enjoy food. The nature of this illness allows your doctor to predict with pinpoint accuracy the hour of your demise. You gather your family and friends to tell them how much you've enjoyed your life, and how much you love them all. You make practical arrangements for your property and business interests. If you are religious, you receive the last rites and make peace with your God. You are able to distil and pass on the wisdom accrued over your long life. You eat one last, delicious, meal. You raise your hand and say 'Goodbye'. You close your eyes, and die immediately. Your family and friends, although distraught by your leaving, undergo a powerful spiritual experience. Your life and example has enriched their lives. Your funeral is an occasion of joy and renewal, attended by thousands. You will live forever in the memory of those you have left behind.
We know, of course, that dying isn't like this at all. Most people die after a long, chronic illness. Death is most likely to happen in a general hospital or a nursing home. It is much less likely to happen at home, and even less likely to take place in a hospice. Many dying people do not know they are at the end of life: an audit of deaths in English in 2014 found that less than half knew they were dying. 5 Dying people commonly spend their last days unconscious, sedated and pain-free. This fantasy described above is at least partly fuelled by the modern gospel that is the 'compression of morbidity'. This concept was popularised by James F. Fries, a Professor of Medicine at Stanford, who first wrote about his theory in 1980. 6 Put simply, the 'compression of morbidity' teaches that as longevity increases, old age will be a period -increasingly longer -of active life and good health, ending with a short, relatively painless, final illness. American baby-boomers, bombarded with images of jogging octogenarians, have invested heavily in this concept and are desperate for it to be true. Unfortunately, it isn't: in a 2010 review of trends in mortality and disability in the USA, Crimmins and Beltrán-Sánchez concluded:
The compression of morbidity is a compelling idea. People aspire to live out their lives in good health and to die a good death without suffering, disease, and loss of functioning. However, compression of morbidity may be as illusory as immortality. We do not appear to be moving to a world where we die without experiencing disease, functioning loss, and disability. 7
A hesItAtIon to be brAve
Much of the behaviour of people around the dying is characterised by sentimentality and evasion. This can take many forms: at its simplest, there are the relatives who conceal from the dying person the fact that he or she is dying. Robert Francis stated that no firm conclusions could be drawn from the hospital mortality figures. He acknowledged that unkindness, rather than a high death rate, was the main concern of those who had given evidence: 'It was striking how many accounts I received related to basic elements of care and the quality of the patient experience, as opposed to concerns about clinical errors leading to death or injury.' Despite this, the perception persists among the public, media and politicians that any deaths above the national average must be the consequence of poor care, and therefore avoidable. Stafford has thus fixed an idea in the public consciousness of hospital death as a failure of medical care. The scandal also strengthened the prevailing societal view that doctors and nurses must be more 'accountable'. In Britain there are dozens of agencies, colleges and quangos charged with overseeing those who work in hospitals. The moral philosopher Onora O'Neill addressed this accountability culture in her Reith Lectures in 2002, and observed that while in theory the new regulations make professionals more accountable, in practice they achieve little, except an increase in suspicion: 'currently fashionable methods of accountability damage rather than repair trust.' 19 the lIverpool cAre pAthWAy
The Liverpool Care Pathway (LCP) was scrapped mainly because of sensationalist media coverage. Genuine concerns about a small minority of patients inappropriately put on the Pathway were cynically seized on by the press, who accused hospitals and doctors of carrying out involuntary euthanasia, incentivised by cash bonuses. (In the target-driven NHS, hospitals were actually given bonuses for reaching specific targets on palliative care; one such target was the percentage of dying patients placed on the LCP.) An independent inquiry, chaired by Baroness Julia Neuberger, produced a report called More Care, Less Pathway. 20 The report concluded that when the Pathway was operated by well-trained and well-resourced clinical teams, it worked well. Where care was already poor, the LCP had been used as a tick-box exercise. Neuberger observed that the word 'pathway' is misleading, as it suggests a road going somewhere. She sensibly suggested dropping the word 'pathway' in favour of the more neutral term 'end of life care plan'. Rather bravely, Neuberger concluded that if we don't have a proper national conversation about dying, doctors and nurses will become 'the whipping boys for an inadequate understanding of how we face out final days.'
The relatively few failures of the Pathway had fatally contaminated the 'brand' in the mind of the public. Why did it fail? Most people nowadays die after a long illness.
It can be difficult, therefore, to be sure when a patient has moved from having a chronic illness to dying. Some patients were probably put on the Pathway too early; others should never have been put on the Pathway at all. The vast majority of patients, however, were put on the Pathway correctly, and had an easier death because of it. Poor communication was at the root of virtually all complaints about the LCP. The tick-boxy forms gave the impression of a one-size-fits-all exercise: the mistake was to prescribe for populations, not individuals.
The story of the LCP shows the difficulties faced by doctors working in acute general hospitals. We are simultaneously accused of being both too interventionist and aggressive in our treatment of the dying, and also too hasty in putting patients on a palliative pathway and the syringe-driver. Colleges) saw no need for such legislation. More than 100 oncologists wrote to The Times opposing the Bill: ' We are concerned that rather than promoting responsible scientific innovation in the treatment of cancer, the Medical Innovation Bill will actually encourage irresponsible experimentation producing nothing more than anecdotal "evidence", at the potential expense of causing serious harm and suffering to patients.' The Lancet Oncology devoted an editorial to the Bill, concluding that it 'strikes at the heart of evidence-based medicine.' 23 One of the last decisions taken by Norman Lamb, junior Health Minister in the Conservative/ Liberal Democrat coalition government, was to veto the Bill in the House of Commons.
Cancer treatment seems to offer some patients a toxic combination of false hopes and a bad death. Even those within oncology accept that the current model of cancer care in developed countries has become unaffordable and unsustainable. The Lancet Oncology Commission produced a lengthy report in 2011 called Delivering Affordable Cancer Care in High-income Countries. 24 The Commission concluded that cancer care is in crisis, driven by overuse and futility, and that 'the medical profession and the health-care industry have created unrealistic expectations of arrest of disease and death. This set of expectations allows inappropriate application of relatively ineffective therapies, including surgery, in the name of care. In developed countries, cancer treatment is becoming a culture of excess.'
Even the language of cancer is different: people afflicted with the condition are expected to 'fight' it; if and when they die, they are said to have 'lost their battle'. Christopher Hitchens observed in his cancer memoir, Mortality: People don't have cancer: they are reported to be battling cancer. No well-wisher omits the combative image. You can beat this. It's even in obituaries for cancer losers, as if one might reasonably say of someone that they died after a long and brave struggle with mortality. You don't hear it about longterm sufferers from heart disease or kidney failure. 25 One of the root causes of this crisis in cancer care is sentimentality. I am often told by well-meaning family members that their stricken relative is a 'fighter', by which they mean that the known biological statistics appropriate to other, lesser souls, do not apply in this particular case. Lance Armstrong persuaded many cancer sufferers, including the singularly unsporty Susan Sontag, that cancer could be 'beaten' by sheer force of will. The American science writer George Johnson observed of this sentimentality in The Cancer Chronicles: Now there is a cancer culture, and whether you had a harmless in-situ carcinoma removed with a simple lumpectomy or are fighting the terminal stages of metastatic melanoma, you are called a survivor. In the first case there was nothing to survive. In the second case there will be no survival. 26 The Irish Cancer Society has launched an 'ambitious new strategy statement' for 2013 to 2017 entitled Towards a Future without Cancer. They modestly concede that 'this may not be achieved in the lifetime of the strategy statement'. 27 Cancer Research UK's current campaign proclaims: 'We will beat cancer.'
do not resuscItAte
In February 2011, Janet Tracey, aged 63, was diagnosed with metastatic lung cancer. Two weeks later, she was involved in a road traffic accident and sustained serious injuries, including a fractured cervical spine. She was taken to Addenbrooke's Hospital in Cambridge, where she was admitted to the ICU. In a paper published in 2014, Fritz et al. summarised the subsequent events: 28 She had metastatic lung cancer and chronic lung disease with an estimated prognosis of 9 months. She was intubated and ventilated, and had two failed extubations. The family were informed that, if the third extubation failed, Mrs Tracey would be 'allowed to slip away', but there was no documentation of a discussion with Mrs Tracey.
A DNACPR form was written, and Mrs Tracey was successfully extubated and moved to the ward. The family subsequently discovered the DNACPR form and asked that it be removed, which was done. Unfortunately, Mrs Tracey deteriorated further and, after discussions with the family (Mrs Tracey was clear at this point that she did not want to discuss resuscitation herself), a second DNACPR form was completed. Mrs Tracey died on 7 March 2011 without attempted CPR.
The family subsequently instituted legal proceedings against the hospital, alleging that Mrs Tracey had two DNACPR orders imposed on her without being informed or consulted. The doctors at Addenbrooke's insisted they had discussed this matter with both the patient and her family. However, because this discussion was not documented in the hospital notes, the High Court Judge Nicola Davies ruled that this conversation had not taken place. Judge Davies, however, declined to hear legal arguments about a breach of human rights, and the family took their case to the Court of Appeal in 2014. Lord Dyson, the Master of the Rolls, said: 'since a DNACPR decision is one which will potentially deprive the patient of a life-saving treatment, there should be a presumption in favour of patient involvement. There needs to be convincing reasons not to involve the patient.'
The Tracey judgment will, I believe, have a profound effect on medical practice. Stories about DNACPR
The way we die now history orders had been appearing regularly in the press even before the Tracey ruling. The usual theme of these stories was of families finding out that their elderly relatives had been subject to a DNACPR order without their knowledge, with the implication that this was a form of back-door euthanasia. These stories fed the same hysteria that led to the end of the It's not a frequent topic of discussion, but doctors die, too. And they don't die like the rest of us. What's unusual about them is not how much treatment they get compared to most Americans, but how little. For all the time they spend fending off the deaths of others, they tend to be fairly serene when faced with death themselves. They know exactly what is going to happen, they know the choices, and they generally have access to any sort of medical care they could want. But they go gently. 30 The uncomfortable conclusion is that doctors routinely subject their patients to treatments they wouldn't dream of having themselves. This does not surprise me. I have often asked my colleagues, when lecturing on the subject of PEG tubes, whether they would ever agree to having this procedure performed on themselves: the answer is usually a near-unanimous 'No'.
conclusIon: We cAn't prescrIbe A 'Good deAth'
Every month seems to arrive with yet another wellmeaning report on end-of-life care. These documents are all based on the unspoken assumption that death can somehow be sanitised and standardised. There is a perception -even a consensus -that death is something that medicine should somehow 'sort out', that a 'good death' is something that doctors should be able to prescribe, as we might prescribe a course of antibiotics. But our needs are spiritual, not medical. Medicine's dominion should be limited and explicitly defined. Medicine, and our culture, would be happier and healthier if we stopped expecting it to solve our existential problems, if we stopped thinking of our bodies as machines, and if we gave up our fantasies of control and immortality.
As contemporary issues, assisted suicide and advance directives are both a symptom of a deeper malaise (namely, the obsession with control) and a distraction. They are a distraction because the real issues are elsewhere. Our sense of common decency -of kindness -has become sclerosed. Kindness was the ingredient most lacking in the care of patients at Stafford. Can common decency be regenerated by regulation and government diktat? We have witnessed, to our cost, the poisonous effects of targets, and the paradox that more regulation of professionals leads only to increased suspicion, rather than greater accountability.
We cannot, like misers, hoard health; living uses it up. Nor should we lose it like spendthrifts. Health, like money, is not an end in itself; like money, it is a prerequisite for a decent, fulfilling life. The obsessive pursuit of health is a form of consumerism, and impoverishes us. Medicine should abandon its quest to conquer nature, and revert to its traditional roles of providing comfort and succour, and accompanying the dying: the doctor as amicus mortis. We are frail and vulnerable animals, yet we have come to believe that everything that happens to us -including death -is our fault, our doing, our responsibility. Human agency has replaced the power of nature, in Freud's words, 'majestic, cruel and inexorable.'
S O'Mahony

